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Abstract. Social and administrative sciences categorize rewards with some dimensions. 
However, these interpretative models seem to be elusive because they do not consider all 
the elements of rewards system within public administration. The goal of this paper is to 
suggest a new classification considering formality, tangibility and also legality in order to 
create a comprehensive interpretative model in public sector. This theoretical framework 
begins the process of clarifying and generalizing, as far as possible, the manifold elements 
of rewards system in public administration to lay a foundation for the development of more 
sophisticated taxonomies and theories directed to fruitful management implications. 
Keywords. Monetary rewards, Compensation, Salary, Seat of power, Pay, Bribe, 
Reputation, Abuse of power. 
JEL. B29, L29, L30, L32, M12, M19, M50. 
 
1. Introduction 
he research field of rewards in contemporary human resource management 
and administrative sciences is developed on behavioural research in 
psychology (Armstrong, 2007). These studies analyze how people react to 
rewards and what motivates them to work in organizations (Reif, 1975). In general, 
the concept of rewards is associated with the concept of motivation, which 
indicates the forces that energize, direct and sustain behaviour of individuals (Perry 
& Porter, 1982). Rewards systems in organizations are processes, policies and 
strategies to motivate subjects to achieve strategic goals and enhance the 
productivity and efficiency of organizations (Armstrong, 2007; Reif, 1975). In 
public administration, appropriate rewards can enhance motivation and 
performance of civil servants (cf., Aberbach et al., 1981; Wittmer, 1991). A 
complete rewards strategy in public organizations should achieve two goals:  
 motivate performance of individuals  
 support job satisfaction and commitment 
In public administration studies, the research field of reward management has 
the general purpose of designing best practices of remuneration to support 
performance of individuals and efficiency of organizations. This approach in the 
USA is called the New Pay (Schuster & Zingheim 1992). 
In this context, the study and classification of rewards are a central and 
enduring research theme in public administration to support theoretical and 
analytical studies and appropriate management implications in organizations (cf., 
Hood et al., 2002; Coccia, 2006). In particular, scholars of public administration 
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have analyzed many elements and characteristics of rewards and also organized 
them in classifications and/or taxonomies (Hood & Peters, 1994; cf., Armstrong & 
Murlis, 2004; Armstrong & Stephens, 2005; Mitchell, 1982; Coccia, 2001). In 
science, although the concepts of ‚classification‛ and ‚taxonomy‛ are almost 
synonyms, they have different meaning. The term taxonomy (from ancient Greek 
word taxon=arrangement, array) refers to a branch of systematics based on the 
theory and practice of producing classification schemes with the aim of 
maximizing the differences among groups. Thus, a taxonomic process provides 
rules on how to form and represent groups in classifications. Instead, classification 
is the product of the taxonomic process that represents classes of entities with a 
matrix, or a table, or a dendrogram, etc. (McKelvey, 1982). Taxonomy has 
usefulness in natural and social sciences if it is able to reduce the complexity of the 
population studied into simple classes, which are represented by a classification. 
Specifically, social sciences have two general approaches to create a classification: 
the empirical and theoretical one (Rich, 1992; Doty & Glick, 1994). Theoretical 
classifications in social sciences begin by developing a theory of differences, which 
then results in a classification of typologies. The empirical approach begins by 
gathering data about the entities under study that are then processed using 
statistical techniques to produce groups with measures of similarity, such as 
Euclidean distance (Coccia, 2006).  
The subject matter of this study here is taxonomy of rewards in public 
administration. Some studies of public administration categorize some typologies 
of rewards (Hood & Peters, 1994; Gkorezis & Panagiotis, 2008) but a 
comprehensive taxonomy based on manifold dimensions of rewards systems is still 
hardly known.  
This paper has two goals. The first is to propose a new taxonomy of rewards 
systems in public administration based on characteristics of legality, formality and 
tangibility. The second is to explain each single element of this taxonomy in 
relation to civil servants. Practical implications of this study are management 
practices directed to improve motivation of individuals and efficiency of 
institutions in public administration. Moreover, this study can encourage further 
theoretical and empirical explorations for the development of more sophisticated 
concepts and taxonomies in the domain of public organizations. 
 
2. Theoretical framework  
The term ‘reward’ comes from Middle English meed, mede (‚reward, meed, 
recompense‛). In the field of human resource management, the concepts of reward, 
compensation and remuneration are used interchangeably. In the USA the term 
compensation is used more than reward (White, 2016). In general, rewards are a 
system of elements to compensate performance of subjects and incentivize their 
motivation within organizations (Benati & Coccia, 2018). Rewards systems can 
include tangible elements (e.g., remuneration and other benefits) and intangible 
elements (e.g., reputation, job responsibility).  
Specifically, rewards within public organizations have a powerful effect on 
performance, motivation, commitment and satisfaction of public officials and civil 
servants towards achieving strategic goals (Bowman, 2010; O’Reilly et al., 1991). 
A main element of the rewards systems is thepay that is given by organizations to 
employees for contribution to working toward the achievement of goals (Heneman 
& Judge, 2000; Milkovitch & Newman, 2004). Pay is often used as an incentive for 
performance (Gardner et al., 2004) and as a mean to retain the best employees 
(Trevor et al., 1997; Heneman & Judge, 2000; Tekleab et al., 2005; Currall et al., 
2005; Motowidlo, 1983; Vandenberghe & Tremblay, 2008). The effects of under 
reward, as expressed in justice theory (Heneman & Judge, 2000), have also 
received considerable attention in literature in order to demonstrate the behavioural 
implications of perceived injustice in reward allocation (Greenberg & Wiethoff, 
2001). In fact, theory and empirical evidence suggest behavioural implications 
from pay satisfaction or dissatisfaction (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). 
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Several features of public organizations affect reward systems. White (2016, 
p.3-4) identifies four characteristics. First, public accountability affects the design 
of reward systems since public servants are under the direct control of the 
government; their salaries are paid for through taxation and jobs aredirected to 
supply public services for the benefit of citizens and society. In fact, public sector 
provides services that tend to be public goods: they transcend commercial and 
economic goals and are aimed to ‚social utility that benefits all and excludes none‛ 
(Beszter, 2016, p.356). Second, public sector tends to be labour rather than capital 
intensive. As a matter of fact, the reduction of personnel in public organization can 
generate a reduction of the quantity and quality of public services. Third, as said, 
many public services can be a public good (being non-rivalrous and non-
excludable) that generates local or national monopolies, or natural monopolies in 
specific sectors with high infrastructural costs, such as water and electricity. Public 
services have also market failures and need government regulation. Fourth, high 
level of union membership in the public services of many countries has generated 
centralized and bureaucratic approaches to reward design, determined through 
collective bargaining or statutory means. In fact, pay determination and reward 
systems for civil servants and bureaucrats are different from private sector because 
based on a national bargain, such as between trade unions and central government 
and/or specific departments. Finally, civil servants should be motivated by the 
concept of public service rather than income maximization. This feature influences 
the design of reward policies in public administration that are mainly based on 
career development, equity of treatment, recognition of service and loyalty rather 
than monetary incentives for high performance (Plant, 1993). Hence, in the public 
sector, reward system is bureaucratic with uniformity in pay progression systems. 
In fact, additional and variable pay ad personam have been very limited in public 
organizations, except in sector where there is a competition with the private sector, 
such as public broadcasting (cf., White, 2016).  Benefits in public administration 
are also the provision of generous pension entitlement, though pay and pension 
determination methods for civil servants and bureaucrats vary considerably 
between countries. 
White (2016) identifies three main ways of monetary reward changes in the 
European and US public sector: (1) changes in the method and locus of pay 
determination, (2) changes in grading and job classification, and (3) changes in pay 
progression systems.  
In public administration studies, rewards can be categorized considering 
different characteristics.  
 As far as the feature of measurability is concerned, rewards can be: 
  
 
 
- Measurable rewards are tangible elements measured through monetary 
units (e.g., pay) and/or other units of the metric system. Monetary rewards are 
effective if they are supported by better performance appraisal systems, but such 
systems are often inadequate in public organizations (Andersen & Pallesen, 2008). 
The impact of financial rewards on performance depends on positive price effect 
and on negative crowding-out effect. These effects of monetary rewards for civil 
servants can be weaker than private sector employees for two causes. Firstly, the 
public sector cannot offer substantial incentives similar to private sector, due to the 
institutional characteristics of public organizations. Secondly, civil servants tend to 
be more intrinsically motivated than private sector employees (Belle & Cantarelli, 
2015, p.12ff). This result is consistent with the analysis by Weibel et al., (2010) 
that shows how the effect of financial incentives on performance is stronger with 
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non-interesting rather than interesting tasks (cf., Grant & Shin, 2012; Ryan & Deci, 
2000, 2000a). 
- Unmeasurable rewards are intangible elements difficult to measure, such as 
job responsibility, professionalism, etc. Perry & Porter (1982) and Rainey et al., 
(1976) argue that monetary rewards are less important than no pecuniary rewards. 
Some scholars state that: ‚less tangible rewards of praise and recognition have to 
be supplemented by more tangible ones‛ (Kernaghan, 2001, p.79). 
Lincoln & Kalleberg (1990) have argued that the rewards offered by an 
organization may have a powerful effect on employees’ attitudes towards their job 
and the organization for which they work. Perry & Hondeghem (2008, p.vii) claim 
that: ‚people are selfish and altruistic and organizations need to use intrinsic as 
well as extrinsic incentives to motivate employees‛. In this context, it is also 
important to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards.  
 
 
 
 Intrinsic rewards are those that exist in the job itself and give personal 
satisfaction to individuals, such as autonomy, recognition, expense preference (e.g., 
leeway to invest monetary resources), trust and empowerment. In particular, 
intrinsic rewards generate positive effects on job involvement, satisfaction and 
affective commitment (O’Driscoll & Randall, 1999). 
 Extrinsic rewardsare tangible and visible rewards given to individuals for 
achieving goals. They usually include elements, such as pay and fringe benefits, 
gifts, promotion or advancement opportunities, etc. within the organization. Studies 
have investigated whether and how extrinsic rewards undermine public employee 
motivation, generating a crowding-out effect that decreases their effort and 
performance (e.g., Georgellis et al., 2011; Weibel et al., 2010). Extrinsic rewards, 
based on contractual obligations, may be ineffectual and counterproductive in the 
public sector because when public servant’s effort has high-powered incentives 
with pay for performance, it can crowd out public service motivation (cf., Frey & 
Jegen, 2001; Francois, 2000). 
O’Reilly et al., (1991) have suggested that intrinsic rewards may be more 
salient for affective commitment, job involvement and motivation of subjects in 
organizations, whereas extrinsic rewards are more likely to be important in relation 
to continuance commitment to the organization.  
Frey & Jegen (2001) also show that extrinsic incentives (e.g., monetary 
rewards) can crowd out intrinsic motivation of individuals, resulting in lower 
organizational productivity. In fact, studies confirm that extrinsic rewards can 
reduce intrinsic motivation, such as Bénabou & Tirole (2003) show conditions 
under which explicit (high-powered) incentives rewards crowd out performance, 
compared to low-powered alternatives (cf., Langbein, 2010). Moreover, empirical 
evidence suggests that both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations can be effective in 
deterring corruption (cf., Georgellis et al., 2010; Houston, 2006; Ryan & Deci, 
2000; Titmuss, 1970). In general, studies show that in mission-oriented 
organizations, extrinsic rewards crowd out intrinsic rewards (Hartwig, 2004; Frey, 
1993, 1997; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Kreps, 1997). According to the 
insufficient justification effect (in which both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards are 
low), people may change their self-perception and claim that they do it for the 
intrinsic value of their job (Staw 1976; Liu & Tang, 2011). 
Hood & Peters (1994) in this research field argue that rewards systems are 
characterized by two dimensions, formality and tangibility. The first dimension, 
formality, deals with the extent to which the rewards of office are officially 
sanctioned and transparent. The second dimension of rewards is tangibility, when 
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elements have a physical form that can be perceived and touched by subjects, vice 
versa is intangible (Benati & Coccia, 2018). These two dimensions of rewards 
systems generate a 22 matrix displaying each element in a cell, as represented in 
Figure 1 by Hood & Peters (1994, as quoted by Brans & Peters, 2012, p.4).  
 
 Formality 
Tangibility Formal Informal 
Tangible Salary  Post-governmental employment 
Intangible Medals Respect 
Figure 1. Dimensions of rewards by Hood & Peters (1994, as quoted by Brans & Peters, 
2012, p.4) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Classification of the elements of rewards system in public administration with 
taxonomic criteria of legality, formality and tangibility 
 
3. Towards a taxonomy and theory of rewards systems in 
public administration including legality 
The interpretative model by Hood & Peters (1994) and other classifications just 
mentioned include only legal elements of rewards systems. These models can also 
be integrated with the dimension of legality, allowing further categorizing the 
elements of rewards systems into legal and illegal, in order to detect good and bad 
practices in public sector (cf., Benati & Coccia, 2017; 2018). In fact, this study 
proposes a new classification of rewards system in public administration based on 
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taxonomic criteria of Legality, Formality and Tangibility. Figure 2 shows this 
classification with main elements of rewards systems in public administration.  
* Description of the elements of the classification of rewards systems in public 
administration 
Rewards systemsin public administration can be different a cross countries, 
because they include different combinations of elements that are described as 
follows, considering the dimension of legality and sub-dimensions of formality and 
tangibility (cf., Benati & Coccia, 2017; 2018). 
Figure 2 shows, in the top section, the four elements of the legal rewards system 
in public organizations: 
* Compensation is a formal and tangible element of legal rewards. This reward 
is extrinsic and measurable. Compensation can include basic categories: a). 
Guaranteed pay – a fixed monetary reward paid by a government institution to 
bureaucrats and civil servants. The most common form of guaranteed pay is the 
base salary. Guaranteed pay also includes cash allowances (housing allowance, 
transport allowance, etc.), differentials (shift differentials, holiday differentials) and 
premiums (overtime, etc.). b)Variable pay – non-fixed monetary reward paid by a 
government institution to civil servants – is contingent on discretion, performance, 
and/or results achieved; c).Benefits are programs that a government institution uses 
to supplement civil servants’ compensation, such as paid time off, medical 
insurance, and more. 
Allowance is another formal and tangible element of legal rewards in public 
administration. An allowance is an amount of money given or allotted at regular 
intervals to particular civil servants for a specific purpose. The government 
institution supplying the allowance may put controls in place to make sure that the 
money is spent for that purpose only. Allowances may be travel expenses, daily 
allowance (also called ‘subsistence allowance’), general expenditure allowance, 
medical costs, end-of-term allowance, etc. 
* Awards area formal and intangible element of legal rewards. An award is 
something given to a person in recognition of their excellence and best 
performance in certain fields or positions. An award may be accompanied by 
trophy, title, certificate, commemorative plaque, medal, badge, pin, or ribbon. It 
may also simply be a public acknowledgment of excellence, without any tangible 
token or prize. 
Seat of power in public institutions may be also a formal and intangible element 
of legal rewards. Seats of power are desired roles and/or official positions leading 
to personal recognition, such as being a secretary of state, director, to have job 
responsibilities of key departments, etc.  
* Post-government employment and Post-career positions are informal and 
tangible elements of legal rewards system. In fact, the technical expertise of 
bureaucrats and civil servants accumulated during their career in public sector may 
increase their attractiveness to private sector. For instance, a retired police official 
can work in private investigation companies, private security companies, etc.  
* Reputation is an informal and intangible element of legal rewards for civil 
servants and bureaucrats. Reputation (from the Latin word reputationem, which 
means ‘consideration’) is the general belief or opinion held by other people 
regarding a person’s specific characteristics or abilities in certain public positions.  
In addition to legal rewards system, described above, other rewards elements in 
public administration may be illegal. These elements may generate benefits in 
terms of private interests of bureaucrats and civil servants, their families and 
friends. An example is that of financial interests. Figure 2 also includes, in the 
bottom section, the four elements of the illegal rewards system in public 
organization. Kwon (2012) suggests that bureaucrats and civil servants are led to 
corruption (and as a consequence to illegal rewards) partly because their public 
service efforts on the job are not properly rewarded extrinsically or intrinsically. 
 Gifts may be a formal and tangible element of the illegal rewards system in 
public organizations. An illegal ‘gift’ can be anything of considerable monetary 
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value and/or and other items of high intrinsic value. A gift offered because of the 
employee’s official position may create an appearance of using public office for 
private gain. The latent aim of the donor is to receive preferential treatment as a 
result of the gift. Common illegal gifts to bureaucrats and civil servants are: 
expensive watches, jewellery, new cars, leisure travels, cheap or free renovation of 
private houses, houses sold at low prices, etc. However, items of little intrinsic 
value, such as modest refreshments or greeting cards, are not considered ‘illegal 
gifts’.  
 Abuse of authority may be a formal and intangible element of the illegal 
rewards system. Abuse of authority is the use of legislated or otherwise authorized 
powers by government officials for illegitimate private gain. For criminal law, 
abuse of authority is an action performed by a subject who has been vested with 
public powers but that is opposite to the obligations imposed by law. In the form of 
corruption, it is the use of legislated powers for illegitimate private gain. In general, 
abuse of authority occurs when unsuperiors take advantage of their office and its 
powers against someone who is located in a situation of dependency or 
subordination or simply users of public services. A form of abuse of authority 
occurs when public officials who accede to a post or a function leverage the power 
granted to them by law to their own benefit (and/or simply for the sake of 
schadenfreude), and not to develop their public obligations properly. 
 Bribes may be an informal and tangible element of the illegal rewards 
system for bureaucrats and civil servants. Bribery is the act of giving money or 
other forms of recompense to civil servants in exchange for an alteration of their 
behaviour (to the benefit/interest of the giver) that public servants would otherwise 
not alter. In short, it is a gift bestowed to influence the civil servants’ conduct. 
Kwon (2012) argues that when performance pay is strong, the bureaucrats and civil 
servants use their discretion to increase their public service performance rather than 
to pursue corruption. 
 Abuse of power may be an informal and intangible element of the illegal 
rewards system for bureaucrats and civil servants. Abuse of power, in the form of 
‘malfeasance in office’ or ‘official misconduct’, is the commission of an unlawful 
act done in an official capacity, which affects the performance of official duties. In 
addition, abuse of power leads individuals to exert pressures through their position 
on someone in a situation of subordination or in need, in order to gain private 
benefits and/or personal satisfaction that can be financial, work-related (e.g., hiring 
friends and/or relatives), sexual, and/or for the sake of schadenfreude, etc. Abusing 
of power can be also used to cover up the deed. Some examples are nepotism, 
taking money from a public fund, sexual affairs, etc. 
Note that, depending on circumstances and laws of countries, in the presence of 
illegal rewards, a bureaucrat and/or civil servant may be imprisoned, fined, 
demoted, or dismissed for violating ethics provisions. 
 
4. Discussion and concluding observations 
Human behaviour can be directed through the selective deployment of rewards 
or sanctions (Simon, 1997). Individuals will perform best when the incentive 
system links rewards as closely as possible to performance. This thesis is also 
supported by behavioural management theory that pay-for-performance enhances 
personal efforts and individual performance (cf., Luthans & Kreitner 1985; 
Lehman & Geller 2004). In contrast to the standard approach of economics, 
psychological studies and self-determination theory argue that there are different 
types of motivations -extrinsic and intrinsic motivation associated with rewards 
system (Frey 1997; Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2002) -and that performance of 
intrinsically motivated tasks is harmed by pay for performance. In particular, 
intrinsic rewards can satisfy personal needs directly for those who perform the 
tasks (Frey & Jegen 2001; George 1992). Put otherwise, intrinsic rewards seem to 
be important drivers of civil servants (Francois 2000; Frank & Lewis 2004; Le 
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Grand 2006). Moreover, studies show that performance-contingent rewards can 
generate different positive effects on performance of employees (Weibel et al., 
2009). In general, the underlying concept to reward systems in public and private 
organization is the motivation that is a main driver of individuals by which they 
achieve goals to fulfil needs and expectations. These individual needs and 
expectations at work can be extrinsic, intrinsic, and social. When a person’s 
motivation is blocked before reaching a desired goal, the result is a frustration-
induced behavior (Mullins, 1999). 
In this context, the suggested taxonomy and theoretical framework described 
above can clarify the most appropriate typologies of the reward system for civil 
servants in public sector. However, the types of rewards applied in public 
organizations should be associated with appropriate theories of motivation, 
considering the motives that influence people’s behaviour at work. Put it 
differently, the taxonomy here, combined with theories of motivation, provide a 
theoretical framework to support best practices of management to work effectively 
in public organization and avoid the risk of corruption and illegal rewards. The 
theories of motivation to design and support reward system in public sector can be 
content and process theory. 
Content theories focus on identifying people’s needs and their relative strengths, 
and the goals they pursue in order to satisfy the needs. This group of theories 
includes Maslow’s hierarchy of needs model; Alderfer’s modified need hierarchy 
model, Herzberg’s two factor theory and Mc Clelland’s achievement motivation 
theory (cf., Mullins, 1993).  
Process theories, instead, focus on process of motivation, such as relationships 
among variables that make up motivation, and how behaviour is initiated, directed 
and sustained. This group includes expectancy-based models, equity theory; goal 
theory and attribution theory. Overall, than public managers should analyze 
different typologies of rewards, combined with appropriate theories of motivation, 
to optimize the effects of reward strategies directed to support motivation and 
performance of specific civil servants and particular work situation. For instance, 
expectancy theory is the most appropriate one for rewards strategies of knowledge 
workers, such as in the public sector of higher education. This theory suggests a 
relation between rewards, the likelihood of earing those rewards and the realization 
of those rewards, if performance is delivered (Mullins, 1993, p.441).   
On the basis of the theoretical framework presented above, the main elements of 
rewards systems in public administration, represented in Figure 2, can also be 
systematized and generalized in a utility function (in a legal setting). This function 
represents a useful conceptual model for analytical studies in different 
environments of public organizations. 
 
The general utility function of rewards system (UFR) is given by: 
UFR=f1 (AL, C, PW, SP, R, PR, AW, EP,, …)  
AL=allowance; C=compensation; PW=power; SP=social position; 
R=reputation; PR=professionalism; AW=awards, EP= expense preference, etc. 
 
This utility function can be applied in public administration studies considering 
appropriate measures of variables and general observations about specific elements 
of rewards systems as follows. Compensation is a core tangible and measurable 
element of legal rewards systems to support motivation and performance of 
subjects in the public sector. Scholars argue that the pay-for-performance applied 
to compensate and motivate public officials and civil servants can produce, by 
itself, only minimally productive performance in public sector (cf., Benati & 
Coccia, 2017). In fact, the literature suggests that performance-based pay rewards 
are only marginally related to public service satisfaction and motivation (Judge et 
al., 2010). In addition, pay-for-performance in public sector can produce hidden 
costs, such as corruption, over-justification effect or crowding-out effect and, as a 
consequence, it may negatively impact performance of civil servants and efficiency 
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of institutions (Lepper & Greene, 1978). Wright (2007, p.60) also argues that: ‚the 
intrinsic rewards provided by the nature or function of the organization may be 
more important to public sector employees than—or compensate for the limited 
availability of—performance-related extrinsic rewards‛. In short, the public sector 
has a low dependence from utilitarian (monetary) incentives and it is basic to find a 
balance between extrinsic rewards (e.g., pay) and intrinsic rewards to improve job 
satisfaction and reduce corruption (cf., Crewson, 1997, p.504; Perry et al., 2010; 
Rainey, 1982, Benati & Coccia, 2018).  
Moreover, the value of a given reward is not absolute, but is relative to other 
rewards with which it is compared, for instance, money as reward per se does not 
lead to satisfaction (Greenberg & Ornstein, 1983). In fact, the crowding-out effect 
suggests that external incentives undermine intrinsic motivation (Frey & Jegen 
2001). This crowing-out effect is one of the most important anomalies in the 
economics of rewards because raising economic incentives may reduce, rather than 
increase individual and organizational performance in the long run. Put it 
otherwise, intrinsic and (to a lesser extent) extrinsic rewards seem to be a predictor 
of job involvement, satisfaction and affective commitment, but not continuance 
commitment (cf., Perry et al., 2010; O’Driscoll & Randall, 2011). In this context, 
self-determination theory argues that performing a task in anticipation of a reward, 
under surveillance, or within a time limit leads to a decrease in intrinsic motivation 
(Deci et al., 1999). 
Crewson (1997, pp.503-4) argues that: ‚Intrinsic rewards are more important to 
public employees than to those employed in the private sector‛. Therefore, intrinsic 
rewards might be more important than extrinsic rewards in public organizations 
that seem to be driven by lower-powered incentive structures (Perry et al., 2010). 
In addition, the subjects in public administration may also be interested in other 
types of intangible rewards represented by schadenfreude, full control, illegal gifts, 
bribes, etc. because of manifold factors affecting human behavior (e.g., greed, etc.). 
Overall, then, this taxonomy here can be a comprehensive model to explain and 
generalize many elements of rewards systems in public administration. These 
conclusions are tentative because the domain of rewards systems in public 
organizations includes a variety of elements associated with different cultures, civil 
laws and rules of law across countries. In particular, the role and function of 
bureaucrats and civil servants and, as a consequence the rewards systems, can 
change when considering Western or Eastern countries, more or less democratic 
nations, etc. Moreover, the boundaries between tangible and intangible elements, 
and/or legal and illegal elements of rewards systems between and within countries 
are not always clear, such as for gifts. Hence, the taxonomy presented here is 
adequate in some cases but less in others, due to diversity of rewards systems 
across nations and organizations over time and space. 
In conclusion, future efforts in this research field will be directed to refine the 
taxonomy and provide statistical analyses of case studies and empirical evidence to 
better categorize and evaluate types of rewards between public organizations over 
time and space. However, identifying generalizable taxonomy and theory of 
rewards in the fields of public administration at the intersection of economics, 
sociology, management, behavioural psychology and perhaps biology is a non-
trivial exercise. 
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